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GENERAL MOTORS: A GIANT IN TRANSITION

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The robot arm bowed to the chairman of the General Motors Corporation, Roger B. Smith, then swung around and did the same to Dr. Seiuemon Inaba, the president of Fujitsu Fanuc Ltd. Turning again, the unmanned machine reached forward, electric motors humming, and neatly snipped a ribbon in two, ceremonially opening the Troy, Mich., headquarters of the GMFanuc Robotics Corporation, the new company that G.M. hopes will become as prominent among industrial robots as G.M.'s Chevrolets once were on highways.

The June event went largely unnoticed outside the Detroit area, but it said a lot about the state of General Motors, the world's largest industrial corporation, in this third year of the worst recession the automobile industry has endured since the Great Depression. The immense success of the Japanese automobile companies in producing high-quality, low-cost cars - every fourth car sold in America is made in Japan - is forcing G.M. to re-examine the way its does business and is pressuring it to diversify into products other than motor vehicles. Initially, GMFanuc's robots, which should be rolling off the assembly line in the United States sometime in 1984, will be used for auto production at G.M. plants and in other factories, but the company also envisions selling them to other industrial users. "We will be coming up with new products," Roger Smith said during a recent interview. "I predict they will be highly sophisticated, very technologically oriented. We won't be making hula hoops."

In addition to robots, the small computers that now regulate the engines on all G.M. cars will be adapted to other applications, possibly for use on familiar consumer products. "We may make the first electronic, automatic vacuum cleaner," Mr. Smith continued. "You walk out the door in the morning and at 11 o'clock this thing comes out and vacuums the whole house while you're gone."

Ten years from now, G.M. may be the American affiliate of a worldwide automobile combine dominated by the Japanese or it may be as important in robots and computer controls as it once was in tail fins and chrome. Where the industrial giant finds itself in the next decade depends in large measure on the skill and efforts of Roger Smith, the company's 56-year-old financial manager and undisputed overall boss.

When Mr. Smith, who bears an uncanny physical and vocal resemblance to the comedian George Gobel, speaks enthusisatically about robots and computer-controlled appliances, to a large extent he is making a virtue of a necessity. With their advanced production techniques and $1,700-a-car lower production costs, the Japanese car manufacturers have virtually assured that G.M. will not for a long time to come, if ever, earn the profits from automobiles which it did

in the past.

At least a partial explanation of how G.M. finds itself in its present predicament surfaces in a comment by Robert A. Frosch, a former administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration who is now vice president in charge of G.M.'s research laboratories. "As a nation, we fell into the hands of the fast-buck artists," Mr. Frosch said recently. "There was a tendency to worry about the business side rather than the product or the technology side. Now, in the past three years, there is a great rediscovery of technology."

At this point in its 74-year history, General Motors is a giant in transition, scrambling to change from a sluggish, virtually oneproduct company dominating an isolated market, to a more diversified, more efficient organization. The recent three-year depression in car sales produced the first red ink in G.M.'s modern history in 1980, when GM 1st JUMP it lost $762.5 million. Neverthless, G.M. has been spending billions retooling its factories to produce an alphabet soup of new, more fuel-efficent cars - the "X," "J" and "A" models. The results have been mixed, with scant evidence that buyers are being wooed away from imports.

Under this intense pressure to adapt to new conditions, much of the company's fabled arrogance has been replaced by a sort of pragmatism-under-fire. G.M. engineers are diligently studying Japanese factories to see what they can copy or adapt, while company executives are lining up deals with Japanese auto companies, such as the recently consumated ones with the Suzuki Motor Corporation and Isuzu Motors Ltd. for rights to import minicompact cars G.M. cannot economically produce in its own facilities.

Additionally, G.M. has been working on a deal with the Japanese giant, Toyota Motor Company, to build a Toyota-designed car in one of G.M.'s shut-down West Coast assembly plants, probably in Fremont, Calif. Under the proposed arrangement, Toyota would supply the necessary tooling and manage the plant. G.M. has conceded that it cannot match the Japanese at the small-car game and has apparently decided, with admirable hardheadedness, that if you can't beat them, join them. It is a historic concession for G.M., which has long followed the dictum set down by Alfred P. Sloan, who for almost 40 years was the dominant influence at G.M., of producing "a car for every purse and purpose." If the car business had not been so lucrative in the past, G.M. might already have had its own robot for every purse and purpose. It had a primitive robot in operation as early as 1961 and the specifications for some of the earliest assembly robots were developed at G.M. in the mid-1970's. "We said robots were the coming thing then," says one G.M. development engineer, who prefers to be anonymous. "But the attitude then was, 'We make cars, not tools.' "

Roger Smith, the G.M. chairman, admits that the Japanese made better use of American technology than did its originators, who would have laughed had anyone suggested that the foreign manufacturers to whom they sold their inventions would some day become their competitors. "Computer-aided design, numerically controlled robots, all that was developed here at General Motors," emphasises Mr. Smith. "We did not choose to go into the manufacture of them then. In hindsight, we probably should have." He put it somewhat more bluntly in what amounted to a pep talk to the company's 500 top exectives. Speaking of the Japanese, Mr. Smith declared: "Never again can we let them take our technology and beat us at our own game."

Douglas A. Fraser, president of the United Auto Workers union, who has been observing G.M. for most of his life, finds the company's leadership noticeably changed by the trauma of the past three years. "They thought they were just about infallible," says Mr. Fraser. "They had talent in depth. They have an extremely good system, and it worked. But they have never had to face the adversity they are facing now. The only rewarding feature of all this is that it has served to humble them, and I think that's healthy."

A former Chevrolet executive who now works for another automobile company in the Detroit area puts it more subtly: "When I go to parties, G.M. people just don't seem to stand as tall as they used to."

GMFanuc Robotics Corporation, an equal partnership with Fujitsu Fanuc, whose name has since been shortened to

Fanuc Ltd., one of Japan's leading robot producers, is symbolic of the new pragmatism at General Motors that may help G.M. executives to regain their lost height advantage. It is the first domestically based joint venture in which G.M. has participated in more than 40 years. Until recently, if G.M. wanted something, it bought it or invented it on its own.

Now it wants a big piece of what GMFanuc's president, Eric Mittelstadt, says some estimate will by 1990 be a $1 billion to $5 billion-a-year robotics industry in the United States, an industry that other American auto manufacturers, strapped for funds, have yet to enter. G.M. linked up with Fanuc because it needs the Japanese company to supply relatively simple, moderately priced robots while G.M. itself develops more sophisticated systems, such as the N/C (numerically controlled) multiple robot system, a completely automated painting system now being installed in its plants.

"It's a matter of timing. G.M's strength is in the high technology area of specialty systems," says Mr. Mittelstadt. "When we decided to go into the robotics business, we realized we needed a broader line of products. In order to get that broader line quickly enough to be effective, we felt we needed a partner." So the Chevrolets and Pontiacs of GMFanuc's robot line will come from Japan's three plants, while G.M. works on the Buicks and Cadillacs in an as-yet-undesignated plant in the United States. As part of the process of introducing new models of cars and trukcs, G.M. is gutting its existing plants and installing the robotic equipment. On the 14th floor of General Motors's world headquarters building in Detroit, where top executives work behind two sets of locked and guarded doors, there is more than a little defensiveness about the current situation. "The most comfortable positon for anybody to be in is hindsight," says F. James McDonald, the former foundry engineer who has been president and chief operating officer of G.M. since early last year. Among the younger executives, the men in their mid-to-late 40's who are the next generation of leadership, there is, however, a willingness to admit that mistakes have been made. William E. Hoglund, head of G.M.'s Pontiac division and one of the fast-rising names in the company, argues that G.M. was as good as it had to be until the Japanese raised the stakes. "You can't fight history," Mr. Hoglund says. "The opening of international borders has brought some competition in here that has brought new standards of quality and productivity. But operating under the environment at the time we did, I think we operated as rational businessmen."

With the benefit of hindsight, G.M.'s bosses probably would have done a lot of things differently. After the second oil crisis in 1979, it became clear that the 18-foot-long, 4,000 pound "fullsize" cars that were Detroit's specialty were fast becoming obselete. G.M.'s response was to announce a five-year, $40 billion plan to completely redesign all its cars and retool its plants to make more efficient cars more efficiently. Thomas A. Murphy, then G.M. chairman, described it in Olympian terms as "the most ambitious product and facility improvement program ever undertaken by any corporation in the world at any time in history."

The variety of new cars would be staggering, ranging from minicompacts with tiny 3-cylinder engines to full, six-passenger family sedans. There would be electronic engine controls, front-wheel drive and smooth, gearless automatic transmissions. An industrial renewal that would normally take the better part of a generation would be carried out in five years and, for the most part, it would be done in the United States. While other automakers were looking overseas for lower labor costs and already developed components, G.M. was confident that its technical prowess and financial muscle could do the job at home. That, of course, was before it learned the true dimensions of the advantages enjoyed by the Japanese.

James E. Harbour, who had spent 23 years in obscurity at the Chrysler Corporation as a manufacturing engineer, gained insight into those dimensions in 1980 when he left to establish his own consulting firm and began studying Japanese production costs in detail. Mr. Harbour found that the Japanese had managed to combine advanced production techniques, labor-management cooperation and lower wage rates to produce and ship a typical subcompact car to the United States market for $1,700 less than could American manufacturers of cars made in the United States. Harbour also found that the higher pay of American workers was only a relatively small part - about $550 - of the cost gap, and a large part of that amount was due to the Japanese ability to put a car together with 60 hours of labor compared with about 120 hours in the United States.

Here is how Mr. Harbour, whose study was cited in Transportation Secretary Drew Lewis's May 1982 report on the auto industry, breaks down the Japanese manufacturing cost advantage on a typical subcompact car: more advanced technology, $73; better quality control, $329; lower parts inventories, $550; better materials handling, $41; better use of labor, $478; lower absenteeism, $81; different assembly-line relief systems, $89, and lower union representation cost, $12. The result, after adding in the labor cost advantage, is that the Japanese have figured out a way to make a car for $2,203 less than the American companies who taught the world how to mass produce. Shipping, handling and import duties reduce the advantage by $585, leaving the Japanese with an advantage of $1,718. The recent decline in the value of the yen in terms of the dollar has only magnified the Japanese cost advantage.
GM 2d JUMP Since many American car buyers have been willing to pay over sticker price to get a high-quality Japanese car, the Japanese have kept their prices high and pocketed the profit. As Transportaion Secretary Lewis pointed out, the Japanese "have used the knowledge that they can underprice competing U.S. models if necessary and still enjoy handsome profits." It was an ominous message for G.M., which remained concentrated in the United States market while its archrival, Ford, successfully established itself in markets overseas that are protected aganst the full impact of the Japanese onslaught. Even if G.M. can produce cars with Swiss-watch quality appeal, the Japanese could always lower their prices. "The fact that a group of competitiors ... has the potential for substantial price reductions places a serious restriction on the ability of the U.S. manufacturers to expand their domesic market share or to increase exports," Mr. Lewis said. In their public appearances, the top executives of General Motors present a conservative appearance and often adopt a rural, folksy manner. None of them are cigar puffing, blunt-talking, slightlylarger-than-life versions of Lee A. Iacocca, Chrysler's chairman of the board and chief executive officer. The G.M. system puts an emphasis on team play; it does not encourage eccentricity. So it comes as something of a surprise for an outsider to find that G.M. executives consider themselves heroic figures - the economic equivalent of daring military commanders who are dispatching billions of dollars and hundreds of thousands of employees in high-risk counterattacks on the automotive battlefield.

"I think the fact that we have committed $9.7 billion in 1981 to establish our 1983, '84, '85 product programs takes a lot of guts," says G.M.'s president, F. James McDonald. "It takes a lot of guts to lay out your program and say, 'Hey, we're not going to wait until the market turns around; we're saying the markets are going to be outstanding, and we're going to compete in them.' We want to be No. 1."

One of G.M.'s major offensives was the "J" car, introduced in the spring of 1981. The company uses letters of the alphabet to denote cars that are essentially the same, although sold under differing names. The "J" car carried the strategy of commonality to its logical extreme: It is the first car to be sold by all five of G.M.'s automotive divisions, as the Chevrolet Cavalier, Pontiac J2000, Oldsmobile Firenza, Buick Skyhawk and Cadillac Cimarron. Smaller and with better fuel economy than the "X" body cars (G.M's first front-wheel drive compacts), the "J" cars were aimed squarely at the Japanese. Brimming with Detroit's institutional optimism, sales executives allowed as how they hoped to sell a million cars the first year.

They didn't come close. After being introduced in May 1981 to the accompaniment of an advertising blitz, only 249,871 had been sold by May 1982. Financial analysts estimate that G.M. has spent $2.5 billion so far on the "J" car, without making any notable inroads on Datsun or Toyota or any other Japanse makes. G.M. is now halfway through its new model program with three series of modern, frontwheel-drive cars in its showrooms, as well as its sleek, new Pontiac Firebird and Chevrolet Camaro sporty cars, yet its share of the American market has not edged much above the 45 percent it has held for the last decade. (G.M. men are quick to point out that the enormous growth of the imports, from 15.22 percent of the market in 1971 to 28 percent last year has come almost completely at the expense of Ford and Chrysler.)

There is a sense of confusion about what consumers really want. "This is the first time since I've been in the automobile industry that we haven't had a fix on the market," said William Lane, sales manager for Pontiac, at this year's Chicago auto show. Robert C. Stempel, general manager of G.M.'s Chevrolet division, recalls one young sales executive blurting out in frustration, "What in the hell is going on out there?"

One of the things that's going on out there - defined as anywhere outside Detroit or Bloomfield Hills, the affluent suburb that is home to most of G.M.'s top executives - is that Americans seem to be changing their attitude toward cars, looking at them more as transportation appliances than dream machines. Americans used to sing about cars, from the celebration of mobility ("In My Merry Oldsmobile") in the early years of the century to the 1960's muscle-car fantasies of "Little GTO." Lately, there haven't been many songs about cars. Americans seem less impressed by annual model changes and more willing to hang on to the old rust bucket. The average age of the car on the road today is 7 years old compared with 5.7 a decade ago.

It is ironic, says Mr. Stempel, that as the American affair with the automobile has cooled, the variety of mechanical temptations available has increased. Because of the imports and rapid change in domestic products, car buyers have more choices than in Detroit's golden era of the 1950's and 60's. They can buy models with four-, six- or eight-cylinder engines, diesel or gasoline powered, turbocharged or normally aspirated, front- or rear-wheel drive. Convertibles have returned. Small pickup trucks have all the comforts of luxury cars. Eventually, of course, the field will narrow, as low-selling designs are phased out. And looming over the whole industry is the uncertain outlook for fuel prices. "I'd sure like to know which way it's going to go," says Mr. Stempel, "so I can decide what to invest in and what to shut down." Meanwhile, the automobile industry in the United States is reeling: American Motors has become an effective subsidiary of the nationalized French company Renault; Chrysler needed $1.2 billion in federally backed loans to survive; Ford is being supported by its overseas operations. General Motors, which made money throughout the Depression, had a loss in 1980 and its $333.4 million profit last year was more the product of artful bookkeeping than automobile sales. (This year, industry analysts expect it to make about $1 billion.)
GM 3rd JUMP As it has struggled to retool its plants and bring out new models of cars in spite of anemic sales, G.M.'s financial health has weakened. Working capital dropped $5.6 billion in 1980 and 1981 and the company was stripped of one of the prized corporate badges of honor, its AAA credit rating. G.M. now has to pay more than $1 billion in interest each year and over the next three to four years will have to pay back about $3 billion in long-term debt - the equivalent of an entire new line of cars or trucks. Confronted with this financial weakness and the production-cost advantages of the Japanese, Mr. Smith and his colleagues have been forced to toss parts of their grand plan onto the scrap heap.

G.M.'s switch from a macho, go-it-alone approach to car making to one of cooperation in areas where it needs help, along with the company's plans to diversify and make products other than cars, is being interpreted as a sign that Mr. Smith is pragmatic enough to rewrite the formulas of the past. Maryann N. Keller, a widely followed Wall Street stock analyst, last spring recommended that her customers buy G.M. shares, "based on our assesment that G.M.'s present management is fundamentaly altering the company."

The arrangements with the Japanese are also prompting something of a positive re-evaluation of Mr. Smith's leadership, after some notable public stumbles during his first year and a half as chairman. Shortly after taking over as G.M.'s chairman on Jan. 1, 1981, Mr. Smith raised car prices, only to be forced to offer rebates a few months later. Fairly or unfairly, he has been blamed for the early flop of the "J" cars.

Negotiating in secret with the United Auto Workers' president, Douglas Fraser, Mr. Smith came up with a plan that would have tied concessions by union workers to lower car prices. When the agreement was announced early this year, G.M.'s car sales nearly ground to a halt as prospective buyers waited for the price reductions that never came because rank-and-file G.M. workers balked at the company's demand for a $5-an-hour cut in pay and benefits. Nor was his public image burnished when he announced that all G.M. white-collar employees would sacrifice equally to finance a rebate program and then said that his share would be $135 a month, out of a salary that last year amounted to $475,000.

There were some in the industry who questioned the wisdom of choosing Mr. Smith, a financial man who has never participated in the design or engineering of an automobile, to lead General Motors at a time when the company's basic product is undergoing such basic change. Tension between engineers and marketing specialists, the socalled "car men," and financial experts, derided as "bean counters," are endemic in the automobile business. At G.M., the finan-

cial men ususally come out on top.

Hard work and long hours are another Detroit tradition, and Mr. Smith is no exception. He routinely puts in 10-and 12-hour days that begin at 6:30 A.M. when a chauffer-driven car picks him up for a 7 o'clock breakfast meeting at the G.M. building with his top aides. He often remains at his desk until after dark. His is not an untypical schedule in the fiercely competitive car business. Mrs. Gerald Greenwald, the wife of Chrysler's vice chairman, once observed that "being an automotive wife prepares you for divorce or widowhood. One just learns to live independently."

Behind Mr. Smith's desk sit three fat briefcases. One, he explained to a visitor, is for things to be read at home, one for matters to be dealt with at the office and one for reading in the car. The car briefcase has one notable difference from the others; it doesn't contain any financial reports. Mr. Smith, who took extra differential-equations courses in college to increase his grade average, says he finds it hard to analyze columns of numbers in a moving car. It will evidently take more than hard work to overcome one of the most serious problems facing facing G.M: the alienation of a large proportion of its more than 300,000 blue-collar workers in this country. The company's new union contract, which went into effect last March and runs to September 1984, barely won rank-and-file ratification with a 52 percent majority, in contrast to the 73 percent margin at Ford. And the company has been less than successful in squeezing out concessions at the plant level, one of the major provisions of the new agreement. Only about 40 of the company's 117 plants approved the work rule changes the company requested.

Perhaps it is G.M.'s size or the impersonal nature of its system, but assembly-line workers seem more hostile toward G.M. than other auto companies. In Detroit, factory workers refer to the No. 2 automaker as "Ford's," as if it were still Henry Ford's family company. At G.M., a visceral hostility toward the company made it difficult for union leaders to sell the new agreement, even though it meant increased job security. "There's no doubt about the attitude of our members toward G.M.," Douglas Fraser says. "They view them as rich, even when they aren't rich, and arrogant."

When a new, more lucrative bonus plan, which would have established a $60 million-a-year fund to be divided among the 500 top executives, jeopardized relations with unionized workers who had made wage and benefit concessions in their new contract this year, the company backed down and suspended the new bonuses until the union contract expires.

The deals with the Japanese, applauded as they have been by the financial community, have only aggravated long-standing suspicions that G.M. looks upon its employees as an expendable factor of production. "You know, you can't trust G.M., says Lawrence E. (Red) Connor, president of the U.A.W. local at G.M.'s Wilmington, Del., assembly plant. "They have no loyalty to any country or anybody," he added in a reference to G.M.'s interest in going any place where labor costs are cheaper. Labor relations have improved at some G.M. facilities, notably at the "home" plants of the Buick and Pontiac divisions, but, on the whole, they appear worse than at the other United States auto companies, a serious problem at a time when employee involvement is seen as the key to improving product quality.

Tomorrow's cars will be small, but sophisticated. Engineers are working now on radar-controlled brakes that will stop a car automatially if it is about to hit something and controllable suspensions able to shift from a limousine ride to sports-car handling at the flick of a button. Rapid technological advance may give G.M. a chance to pull ahead of the Japanese, whose greatest ability has been efficient, high-quality application of existing techniques.

Maybe it will all work. Maybe, with the help of workers who want to preserve wages that are among the highest in the nation, with automation, with renewed attention to quality, with an end to the recession, American will flock again to G.M. showrooms. But the golden age of General Motors, the 1950's and 60's, when growth was boundless, when energy was cheap, when longer, lower and wider cars were the symbol of success in life, is forever gone. Arvid Jouppi is one of the sages of Detroit, an auto-industry analyst who drives a 1971 Oldsmobile 98 with 144,000 miles on it. "General Motors peaked out in 1966," he says. "Since then it has been struggling with consumerism, government regulations, higher gasoline prices and the surge of imports."

Alfred P. Sloan molded General Motors in the 1920's, developing the "full line" of cars, from Chevrolet to Cadillac, as well as the annual model change, and set the company on a course that was not deviated from for 50 years. Now, beset by a weak economy and the Japanese, G.M.'s present chairman, Roger Smith, has been forced into change. Observes Mr. Jouppi: "Ten years from now we may look back and say Roger Smith was the second Sloan."

The alternative is clear. If General Motors. along with the rest of the American automobile industry, does not regain its competitive vigor it will either collapse before the Japanese onslaught or become like Britain's once-proud auto industry, a sickly ward of the state kept alive at taxpayer expense to preserve the jobs of workers who have nowhere else to go.

Illustrations: Photo of GM Chairman Roger B. Smith

---- INDEX REFERENCES ---

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